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Puerto Rico’s grid was decimated in 2017 after experiencing back-to-back hurricanes – 
Maria and Irma. Although the hurricanes caused tremendous damage and hardship to the island, it 
also created the right circumstances for the local energy landscape to transition toward a more 
resilient and sustainable model. Through an analysis of recent challenges by the local electric 
utility PREPA, and subsequent fallout from the hurricanes, we see that they now hold a unique 
opportunity to redeem themselves by taking advantage of catalyzed resources to rebuild a better 
system. One region that could greatly benefit from an improved and reimagined grid are the two 
island municipalities of Culebra and Vieques. After investigating PREPA’s failures over the last 
10 years, and responses to them, we breakdown the possibility of building a utility-scale solar farm 
on Culebra and how it may contribute to the island’s energy independence. Finally, we look at the 
potential impacts that a project of this magnitude could have on the Caribbean and the way we 
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When it comes to Development, island nations have historically faced a unique set of 
challenges. So much so, that the United Nations has created a specific category through which to 
analyze and support them, identifying these nations through the lens of what they refer to as Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS)1. Most of the constraints encountered by these islands relate to 
their remote existence and very limited natural resources, emphasized by the fact that they are 
surrounded entirely by water.  
Their isolated nature makes it extremely difficult to adequately prepare for and respond to 
natural disasters, in the sense that we are traditionally used to seeing with bordering communities 
and the use of mutual assistance. The challenge of responding to natural disasters is compounded 
by the emerging threat of climate change and the way it has contributed to volatile and intensified 
weather events in the geographic areas where these small islands are typically located – the 
Caribbean, Pacific Islands, and the Indian Ocean/South China Sea2. A major byproduct of these 
weather events, and substantial disruptor, to small islands has been the damage sustained to electric 
power systems, or the grid.  
An island that has been particularly affected by damage to their grid during recent natural 
disasters has been Puerto Rico – an archipelago in the Caribbean Sea primarily made up of one 
mainland island and two smaller island municipalities to the east. Although Puerto Rico has 
experienced many catastrophic weather events over the last 100 years, none have been as severe 
or destabilizing as Hurricane Maria3, which tore through the island in September of 2017 and 
destroyed the island’s electrical infrastructure. Ironically, it is precisely due to the devastation of 
their power system at the hands of Hurricane Maria that they now face a unique opportunity to 
rebuild it, based around the concept of a decentralized grid with more innovative and flexible 
technologies4, and this is especially true for one of Puerto Rico’s two island municipalities – 
Culebra (with Vieques being the other). These island municipalities are better poised than ever 
 
1 “Small Island Developing States - Small Islands Big(Ger) Stakes.” United Nations – OHRLLS, 2011 
2 “Small Island Developing States - Small Islands Big(Ger) Stakes.” United Nations – OHRLLS, 2011, pp. 4-5 
3 “Hurricanes and Tropical Storms in Puerto Rico from 1900 to 1979, 1980 to 2005.” The Puerto Rico Hurricane 
Center 
4 Puerto Rico Energy Resiliency Working Group. “Build Back Better: Reimagining and Strengthening the Power Grid 
of Puerto Rico.” Dec. 2017, pp. 6-7   
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before to increase their resiliency to natural disasters by reimagining and rebuilding their electric 
power system to potentially become energy independent or operate in a micro/minigrid5 state.  
In order to properly legitimize the need for a transition towards decentralizing the electric 
power system of Culebra (and Puerto Rico in general), we must first understand the historical 
context of this undertaking and how previous failures to follow through on promised improvements 
have led to major grief while subsequently increasing the support for sustainable energy 
infrastructure projects by the local and international communities. A project of this scope and 
magnitude would not only be beneficial, but in fact may be crucial, to the long-term sustainable 
development of the two island municipalities. 
Through the inclusion of three separate but related Parts, this paper will first describe the 
challenges and responses to operating an electric power grid in Puerto Rico under increasingly 
hostile weather events and what the impacts have been to the island municipalities, then provide a 
preliminary project design and analysis for a utility-scale6 solar farm on Culebra, with a final 
assessment of future considerations and possible implications that such a project may have 





















5 “Resilient by Design: Enhanced Reliability and Resiliency for Puerto Rico’s Electric Grid.” Siemens, 2018, p. 1 – 
minigrids differ from microgrids in the sense that they supply larger areas than traditional microgrids.  
6 “Renewable Energy: Utility-Scale Policies and Programs.” U.S. Department of Energy: Office of Energy Efficiency 





Puerto Rico’s Electric Power System Challenges and Responses 
 
Small Islands 
Through the framework of Small Island Developing States, we understand that many 
islands face similar difficulties on their quests to develop; whether it be infrastructure, economic, 
social, or human development, these islands are confronted with major challenges compared to 
countries that share land borders. Island nations must deal with the increased cost of transportation 
of goods since the means of either importing or exporting is through marine vessel or aviation 
travel, which happen to be two of the most expensive means of transportation; freight by train, 
road, pipeline are significantly less expensive7. These costs are frequently passed on to consumers 
making the average cost of living much higher than other types of geographic areas8.  
High transportation costs of importing resources to the islands have been responsible for 
increased prices in fuel, food, medicine, building materials, clothes, water, and electricity9. 
Increased costs to export goods have had similar undesirable effects such as limiting economic 
growth potential by restricting the ability to compete in the global marketplace; export led growth 
has generally had low ceilings for island nations10. Puerto Rico has struggled tremendously with 
the issue of transportation in part due to its relationship with the United States (U.S.) and its legal 
requirement to follow the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, also referred to as the Jones Act, which 
mandates shipment of goods between American harbors be transported by U.S. made and owned 
vessels. Studies show that this method of using U.S. flagged sea transport is on average 2.7 times 
more expensive than other foreign based sea transport costs11. We see similar impacts of this 
legislation in other territories not part of the continental U.S. – Hawaii, Alaska, and Guam.  
 
7 “Transportation Economic Trends: Cost of Transportation, Costs Faced by Producers.” U.S. Department of 
Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
8 “Access to Macroeconomic & Financial Data: Consumer Price Index, All Countries: Transport.” International 
Monetary Fund 
9 “Small Island Developing States - Small Islands Big(Ger) Stakes.” United Nations – OHRLLS, 2011, pp. 14-5 
10 Kemp-Benedict, E., Drakes, C. and Laing, T.J. “Export-Led Growth, Global Integration, and the External Balance of 
Small Island Developing States.” Stockholm Environment Institute U.S. Economies, 2018, pp. 13-4 
11 “Comparison of U.S. and Foreign-Flag Operating Costs.” U.S. Department of Transportation: Maritime 
Administration, 2011, pp. 4-5 
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The high costs of transportation and limited economic growth, have made it difficult for 
Puerto Rico to adequately prepare for and react to natural disasters. Small islands are faced with 
preparing for and dealing with major weather events in very limited capacities due to their strained 
economic resources and isolated geography. This makes climate change an ever-increasing 
existential threat that needs to be addressed; we are finding out in the 21st century that islands are 




The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Fifth Assessment Report (IPCC AR5) 
shows with high confidence that weather events like tropical cyclones and sea level rise have 
devastating impacts on small island communities in the present day, and will have progressively 
negative impacts in the future, with both high and current levels of adaptation12. One of the main 
‘key risks’ presented in this report focuses on island infrastructure, including electric power 
systems and the probability that it will suffer losses due to these climatic drivers, as seen in the top 
left corner of Figure 1.113.  
 
  
Figure 1.1 – IPCC AR5 Projected Climate Change Impacts to Small Islands 
 
12 “Chapter 29: Small Islands.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 5th Assessment Report (AR5): Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability - Part B Regional Aspects, 2014, pp. 1634-637 
13 “Chapter 29: Small Islands.” Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 5th Assessment Report (AR5): Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability - Part B Regional Aspects, 2014, p. 1635 
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 Some of the world’s most powerful and recognized organizations, relying on mounting 
scientific data, are predicting that the trajectory of climate change will continue trending upwards 
and that we are likely to experience intensified storm activity and greater weather extremes caused 
by a warming planet14. In fact, Puerto Rico is listed as the number one country most affected by 
extreme weather events, both in terms of fatalities and economic losses (PPP), during the years 
1999 – 2018, according to the Climate Risk Index 202015. This is primarily due to the effects of 
exceptional catastrophes, and this is what was experienced with Hurricane Maria. The hurricane 
season of 2017 was unprecedentedly destructive for Puerto Rico, which experienced back-to-back 
Category 5 hurricanes for the first time in its history, during the month of September 2017 – 
Hurricanes Irma and Maria, respectively.  
 Hurricane Irma passed by Puerto Rico, 60 miles north of the island, as a Category 5 
hurricane during the evening of September 6, 2017. Though the hurricane did not pass directly 
over the territory, the storm caused significant island-wide damage, especially along the northern 
coast, Puerto Rico’s most densely populated region, as well as the two island municipalities. The 
highest recorded sustained wind gusts were in Culebra, topping 110 mph, leading to widespread 
outages in power, telecommunications, and water infrastructure (both supply and wastewater 
treatment)16. These island municipalities were declared disaster zones by then-governor Ricardo 
Rossello. Similar impacts were felt along the mainland of Puerto Rico, experiencing major storm 
surge and flooding in the capital district, the uprooting of trees, collapsing of bridges, failing of 
levees, destruction of homes, and outages in power, communications, and water for more than a 
million residents on the island17. Three deaths were attributed to the storm and restoration efforts 
lasted weeks. As they were nearing the completion of power and telecommunications restoration, 
 
14 a) Knutson, Thomas, et al. “Tropical Cyclones and Climate Change Assessment: Part I: Detection and Attribution.” 
Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, October 2019 
b) “Taking the Heat - Making Cities Resilient to Climate Change.” Goldman Sachs: Global Markets Institute, 
September 2019  
c) “4° Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must Be Avoided.” World Bank: Potsdam Institute for 
Climate Impact Research and Climate Analytics, November 2012 
15 Eckstein, David, et al. “Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2018 
and 1999 to 2018.” GermanWatch: Global Climate Risk Index 2020, December 2019, pp. 9-10 
16 Cangialosi, John P., et al. “National Hurricane Center Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Irma 30 August - 12 
September 2017.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and National Weather Service, June 2018, pp. 
15-29 




the island was struck with a direct impact from Category 5 Hurricane Maria just two weeks later 
on September 20, 2017. Hurricane Irma brought into question the integrity of Puerto Rico’s grid, 
but Hurricane Maria completely exposed it for the weak and frail system that it was.  
 
Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority 
The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA) manages and operates the island’s 
grid, made up of approximately 40 generating stations, 2,500 miles of transmission lines (>38kV), 
30,000 miles of distribution lines (<38kV), 340 substations, and two 38kV submarine cables that 
connect Culebra and Vieques to the mainland power system18. See Figure 1.2 below for a high-
level overview of these assets.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 – U.S. Energy Information Administration GIS Map of Puerto Rico Electric Power System 
This network serves over 1.5 million residential, commercial, and industrial customers on the 
island, making it the largest publicly owned electric utility in the U.S.19, and one of the most 
expensive with typical rates being 30% higher than average U.S. prices for electricity on a per 
kilowatt hour (kWh) basis20. The only states whose electricity rates are comparable are Hawaii and 
Alaska. At first glance, PREPA’s resources may appear to represent a robust system, but upon 
examination one can see this is not the case.  
Out of the 40 generating stations, only 8 locations serve as baseload providers, supplying 
90% of the island’s power demand – AES, Aguirre, Cambalache, Costa Sur, EcoElectrica, 
 
18 “Puerto Rico Territory Profile Overview.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020 
19 “Infrastructure Interdependency Assessment: Puerto Rico.” Department of Homeland Security, May 2018, p. 43 
20 “Puerto Rico Territory Profile Overview.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020 
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Mayaguez, Palo Seco, and San Juan power plants21. All of these are fossil fuel power plants and 
require the importation of either oil, coal, or liquefied natural gas (LNG) to produce electricity. 
Most of the fuel imports are delivered through the harbors at either San Juan in the north or Ponce 
in the south, with special offshore terminals in Peñuelas for the delivery of LNG22. The 
transmission and distribution (T&D) infrastructure topology reflects a system that wraps around 
the island’s perimeter, heavily concentrating itself on the coastline to produce a giant loop, or ring. 
Only 6 high voltage, long distance transmission lines (2 – 230kV, 4 – 115kV) run through the 
interior of the island, connecting the north and south grids, as seen in Figure 1.3.   
 
 
Figure 1.3 – Homeland Infrastructure Foundation-Level Data GIS Map Highlighting Puerto Rico Interior Transmission Lines 
Transmission lines are the backbone of centralized grids and are crucial to electric power 
systems by transporting large amounts of power far distances from where it is produced to where 
it is consumed. They typically supply power to several substations along its path which then branch 
off at distribution voltages to feed the utility customers’ electrical demand. PREPA’s high voltage 
transmission lines that run through the interior of the country are important components of the 
 
21 a) “40th Annual Report on the Electric Property of PREPA.” Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, June 2013, pp. 
8-27 
b) “2019 Fiscal Plan for PREPA.” Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, June 2019, pp. 35-6 
22 “Infrastructure Interdependency Assessment: Puerto Rico.” Department of Homeland Security, May 2018, p. 32 
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overall network that help transport electricity from the south where most is produced, to the north 
where most is consumed23.   
These two primary characteristics form the foundation of the overall structure to the Puerto 
Rico electric power system – few centralized generating stations (favoring the south), with few 
high voltage transmission lines, and substations concentrated along the coasts. The grouping of 
power plants in small pockets and conductors concentrated around the periphery increase the risk 
of blackout and form considerable vulnerabilities for single points of failure. If any one element is 
lost, it may produce overloads on the remaining elements and place stress on the system. If a 
generating station is lost, or a major transmission line fails, the grid’s reliability could become 
jeopardized and possibly run the risk of shutting itself down to protect the rest of its components 
from damage24. Not to mention the risk of only having two ports available for the importation of 
fuel; if one port is lost, significant disruptions to the supply chain could occur, as well as complete 
loss of natural gas if the LNG terminal is taken out of service25.  
Additionally, much of the infrastructure was not built to withstand strong weather events 
and high wind conditions – only 15% of transmission elements were built to endure a Category 4 
hurricane, with the rest built for lesser standards26. When assessed in its totality and all components 
are taken into consideration, one can see that the electric power system in Puerto Rico was 
inadequately designed and woefully underprepared to survive the impacts of major weather events. 
This was made quite clear and observed through the catastrophic damage experienced during the 
hurricane season of 2017, and in particular with Hurricane Maria. The island and its utility 
company, already fatigued from the fallout and restoration of Hurricane Irma, had no choice but 
to brace itself for yet another Category 5 Hurricane, this one anticipated to be much worse.  
 
 
23 “Puerto Rico Public-Private Partnership for the Electric Power Transmission and Distribution System.” Puerto 
Rico Public-Private Partnership Committee Report, May 2020, pp. 16 and 235 
24 Campbell, Richard J., et al. “Repair or Rebuild: Options for Electric Power in Puerto Rico.” Congressional Research 
Service, 16 November 2017, pp. 3-7 
25 “Infrastructure Interdependency Assessment: Puerto Rico.” Department of Homeland Security, May 2018, pp. 
48-50 
26 “Grid Modernization Plan for Puerto Rico.” Navigant Consulting Group prepared for Puerto Rico Central Office of 




Hurricane Maria absolutely decimated PREPA’s electrical network and plunged the entire 
island into darkness – destroying thousands of poles and conductors, rendering 74% of substations 
inoperable, flooding the main generation plants and the utilities’ two control centers, and 
disconnecting the submarine cable that powers the two island municipalities (highlighted below in 
Figure 1.4)27.  
 
 
Figure 1.4 – U.S. Army Corps of Engineers GIS Map Pointing to De-Energized Submarine Cable to Vieques 
Strom damage assessments concluded that there were 1,694 broken wood poles, 551 broken 
concrete poles, 111 broken steel poles, and more than 600 damaged transmission towers. Out of 
the 334 substations, only 12 were deemed to be in good condition, with 121 suffering minor 
damage and 131 experiencing major damage, including flooding, damaged switches and 
transformers, and broken instrumentation and communications equipment28. More than 900 
transmission lines were found to have sustained failures in either the conductors themselves or the 
insulators that connect them to the lattice towers29. Almost every single type of electrical device 
that makes up the grid was impacted by the storm – generators, substations, conductors, switches, 
communications equipment, insulators, poles/towers, control centers, protective relays, and the 
list goes on. The generating stations were able to be brought back online relatively quickly after 
 
27 “Request for Federal Assistance for Disaster Recovery: Build Back Better.” Government of Puerto Rico, November 
2017, pp. 17-21 
28 Puerto Rico Energy Resiliency Working Group. “Build Back Better: Reimagining and Strengthening the Power Grid 
of Puerto Rico.” Dec. 2017, pp. 18-27 
29 “Grid Modernization Plan for Puerto Rico.” Navigant Consulting Group prepared for Puerto Rico Central Office of 
Recovery, Reconstruction and Resiliency, December 2019, p. 23 
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the storm (most within a matter of weeks30), but the extensive damage to the T&D network meant 
there was no way to transport the power to where it was needed. The damages to the submarine 
cables powering the island municipalities were so extensive it took more than a year and a half to 
finally place the section between Vieques and Culebra back into service, requiring the islands to 
use emergency diesel generators to supply their power needs31. Repairing and rebuilding this 
infrastructure was a herculean task and required the cooperation and resources of several 
organizations, including the federal government, over an extended period of time.  
It took the utility, under the leadership of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 11 months to restore power to 100% of its 
customers, making it the longest power outage ever in U.S. history32. This historic power outage 
left an indelible mark on the island and was responsible for the breakdown of critical facilities and 
services all over the island33. To appreciate the impact of a prolonged island-wide blackout, we 
must understand the relationship that power has with other sectors and its significance in the 
operational continuation of the services they provide, for example – emergency response, water 
supply, healthcare, education, and telecommunications. The tremendous ancillary consequences 
of this blackout were devastating and felt throughout the island. The negative impacts of Hurricane 
Maria were certainly felt in other areas of society caused primarily by the physical damage 
sustained to buildings, roads, bridges, agricultural crops, ports, and airports, but the damage 
sustained to electrical infrastructure had especially far-reaching implications.   
Hospitals were unable to power their buildings and medical equipment, water supply and 
treatment facilities were unable to provide or treat water, the telecommunications towers went 
offline with subsequent loss of wireless connectivity, emergency responders were unable to 
connect directly with the public34. All this occurred within a matter of days after Hurricane Maria 
struck the island and people were still very much in survival mode. Hundreds of thousands of 
structures were damaged, people’s homes had been destroyed and families left to the elements, 
 
30 Gallucci, Maria. “Rebuilding Puerto Rico’s Power Grid: The Inside Story.” Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers: Spectrum Journal, 12 March 2018 
31 Vélez, Eva L. “Electric Power Transmission to Culebra, Puerto Rico Restored.” Caribbean Business, 20 March 2019 
32 “Puerto Rico Territory Profile Overview.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020 
33 “Infrastructure Interdependency Assessment: Puerto Rico.” Department of Homeland Security, May 2018, pp. 
35-70 




supermarkets had lost millions of refrigerated inventory, all commercial and industrial activity was 
halted, hotels and emergency shelters went without power, banks were offline with no way of 
distributing funds, there was no way for people who were trapped to contact emergency personnel, 
disaster rescue and recovery efforts were limited during nighttime due to the lack of streetlighting. 
90% of the island’s water system was lost due to damages to the grid which powered the system’s 
pumps and control equipment 35. All 185 hospitals and health clinics suffered serious structural 
damage and power loss; one hospital on the island of Vieques was completely destroyed36. Figure 
1.5 shows the relationship electricity shares with other sectors and its foundational impact. 
 
The island municipalities of 
Vieques and Culebra were left 
without power and communications 
for weeks before ferry transport was 
restored, and utility personnel were 
able to make their way out to 
connect large diesel generators with 
the help of USACE37. These 
generators were used intermittently, 
primarily during the evening hours 
to help power lighting, cooling, and telecoms infrastructure. It would take over a year before these 
islands were finally reconnected to the grid through submarine cable. Over the span of several 
months, once responses and recovery efforts had ramped up, the USACE had installed a total of 
879 commercial sized generators that could power hospitals, schools, emergency management 
centers, transportation hubs, water facilities, communications towers, and even small islands as 
was the case for Vieques and Culebra38. Electrical power was vital for recovery operations and life 
in general – as you can see its impact on the island was enormous.  
 
35 “Request for Federal Assistance for Disaster Recovery: Build Back Better.” Government of Puerto Rico, November 
2017, pp. 70-9 
36 “Request for Federal Assistance for Disaster Recovery: Build Back Better.” Government of Puerto Rico, November 
2017, pp. 24-9 
37 Arnold, Elizabeth. “Vieques No Longer Living on Generators, but Still in Need of Energy Independence.” 
University of Minnesota: Resilience Through Innovation in Sustainable Energy, 15 January 2019 
38 Bourgeois, Reginald. “The Maria Chronicles: The District Deploys.” U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 4 October 2018 
Figure 1.5 – Department of Energy Infographic Displaying Interdependency of 
Electricity with Other Sectors 
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Two weeks after the storm hit, then-governor Ricardo Rossello stated there were 16 
confirmed deaths as a result of Hurricane Maria, later increased to 64 as the official number for 
storm related fatalities by the local government39. Although the immediate aftermath of the storm 
led to a modest death count, that number would quickly balloon to the thousands as a result of 
investigative research conducted by George Washington University. Six months after the storm 
passed, the school published a study that attributed 2,975 deaths to Hurricane Maria and its impact 
on the island40. The study reported that these deaths were mostly incurred by vulnerable members 
of the public who had limited financial resources and had experienced chronic or specialized 
medical conditions and were unable to secure the services they needed, from organizations and 
emergency personnel lacking a variety of resources, including electrical power.  
The destruction to local infrastructure and destabilization of society, caused in part due to 
the loss of the electric power system, led to a massive exodus of people and businesses from Puerto 
Rico. Studies have indicated that more than 200,000 people have migrated from the island in search 
of better living conditions, including access to reliable power41. The electrification of society is 
causing the grid to have a much greater influence over the public, as power was once seen as a 
luxury, it has quickly moved toward necessity and has become an important facet of everyday life. 
Electricity is one of the cornerstones to development and increasingly relied upon throughout the 
world to meet the needs of its people, even comprising one of the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals – #7 Ensuring access to reliable energy for all42.  
As the reliance on electric power increases throughout the world, the impacts of the loss of 
that power also increase. We see with Puerto Rico that the consequences and ancillary effects of 
losing the grid were overwhelming and devastating. Although this blackout was caused by a 
hurricane, many experts question the underlying factors that contributed to the near total failure 
and lengthy rebuild of what was supposed to be a modern and reliable system. We now know the 
grid in Puerto Rico was inadequately designed and managed, particularly in the face of climate 
change and the threat of extreme weather events, but in order to move forward with a plan for an 
innovative rebuild we must first identify and move past the factors that influenced its frailty.    
 
39 Governor Rossello and President Trump official press conference in Puerto Rico on 3 October 2017 
40 “Ascertainment of the Estimated Excess Mortality from Hurricane María in Puerto Rico.” The George Washington 
University: Milken Institute School of Public Health, August 2018, p. 9 
41 “Request for Federal Assistance for Disaster Recovery: Build Back Better.” Government of Puerto Rico, November 
2017, pp. 1 and 13 
42 “Sustainable Development Goals.” United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2020 
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Building a strong and resilient grid requires major investments in time, planning, and 
financial resources – something the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority failed to follow through 
with on numerous occasions over many years. A review of the islands guiding documents on 
electrical infrastructure improvement plans over the last decade reveal an apathetic utility and local 
government, that have repeatedly neglected to act and follow through with promises and 
recommendations not only of their own leaders, but also of foreign entities and subject matter 
experts. Its recent history of energy reform failures is embarrassing and epitomizes an 
administration that has been plagued by corruption, mismanagement, failure to complete projects, 
and meet mandates.  
 
PREPA’s Downfall and How We Got Here 
Alarm bells began to ring in 2010 when Ernst & Young published an independent audit of 
the electric utility that indicated it was holding $7,400M in long-term debt, an increase of $1,625M 
from the year before. This suggested PREPA was operating under a yearly deficit in excess of 




Figure 1.6 – Ernst & Young 2010 Audited Financial Statement of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority 
The audit showed much of this debt was incurred through the issuance of bonds to help cover 
operational expenses and capital improvements, specifically listing some of the projects the utility 
 
43 “Audited Financial Statements Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority for Years Ending 2010 and 2009.” Ernst & 
Young, 31 January 2011, p. 14 
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intended to initiate and their overall costs. PREPA’s balance sheet shows that it borrowed more 
than $200M for the construction of a natural gas pipeline through the interior of the island from 
north to south. This would connect the LNG terminals at Peñuelas in the south, to the power plants 
Palo Seco and San Juan in the northern capital district. The project was called Gasoducto del Norte 
– Via Verde, and was presented as a way to help reduce electricity prices and diversify the energy 
portfolio of the island. After facing public opposition, the utility cancelled the project in 2012 and 
incurred the expense of accumulated interest from borrowed funds that were never used44. Another 
project that met a similar fate was a proposal by PREPA to build an offshore regasification of LNG 
terminal near the southern coast of Guayama to increase the transport capacity and improve the 
supply of gas to Aguirre power plant. After dissent from government officials between 2015 – 
2017, the proposal was finally cancelled in 2018; all this after the utility had already invested 
millions of dollars towards its development in assessment, design, and preparation costs45. PREPA 
was never able to garner enough public support for these projects, doing a poor job of 
communicating the benefits that they would have provided. Albeit not very popular, these 
infrastructure improvements would have addressed some of the vulnerabilities in the electric 
system by strengthening and diversifying the fuel supply needed for the generators – a potential 
liability noted earlier in this paper. The Ernst & Young audit revealed that PREPA was also 
working to diversify their energy portfolio and were expecting to invest heavily in renewable 
energy for distributed generation46 – smaller generators, more spread out, closer to load centers 
(an important component of a decentralized grid).   
 The utility was planning for this transition in large part due to a piece of legislature that 
was passed earlier that year, in 2010 – Act 82 of 2010 Law for Diversification through Sustainable 
Renewable Energy and Alternative Energy in Puerto Rico. Act 82 was a significant piece of 
forward-thinking legislature that mandated the island’s utility diversify its energy portfolio by 
increasing the share of energy produced by renewable sources while also decreasing its 
 
44 “Puerto Rico Integrated Resource Plan 2018-2019 Draft for The Review of the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau (Rev. 
2).” Siemens: Prepared for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 7 June 2019, p. 7-14 (178) 
45 “Puerto Rico Integrated Resource Plan 2018-2019 Draft for The Review of the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau (Rev. 
2).” Siemens: Prepared for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 7 June 2019, pp. 7-7 – 7-9 (171-73) 
46 “Audited Financial Statements Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority for Years Ending 2010 and 2009.” Ernst & 
Young, 31 January 2011, p. 75-80 
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dependence on petroleum (fuel oil)47. This law created Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) that 
required PREPA to increase its share of generation from renewable energy sources and introducing 
a timeline by which to accomplish this. Act 82 stated the utility would need to ramp up its use of 
renewable energy to meet electrical demand to 12% by 2015, 15% by 2020, and 25% by 203548. 
These figures were quite ambitious at the time considering PREPA was generating less than 1% 
of its electricity from renewable sources, and there were no utility-scale wind, solar, geothermal, 
or tidal projects anywhere on the island.  
In 2009, the utility was producing 70% of its power from oil, and 15% each from natural 
gas and coal49. Fast forward to 2013 and the utility’s 40th annual report indicated its fuel mix had 
changed to 54% oil, 28% natural gas, 17% coal, 0.4% hydroelectric, and the remaining 0.6% from 
other renewable sources50. In the span of 4 years, the utility was only able to increase their 
renewable energy production to a little over half a percent of the total supply. They would need to 
increase this figure by 2,000% in 2 years to meet its mandated obligation of 12% total generation 
sourced by renewable energy, according to Act 82. The 40th annual report also stated it was 
projecting the renewable energy supply to grow from 0.6% to 4.5% through 201851, supplemented 
by the release of a document showcasing its renewable energy projects under development, as seen 
in Figure 1.7.  
 
Out of the 9 major projects reported 
on (waste-to-energy plants in Caguas, 
Arecibo, Manati, and Moca, wind farms in 
Guayanilla, Arecibo, Naguabo, and Santa 
Isabel, and a solar farm in Guayama), only 
3 were ever built – the wind farms in 
Naguabo and Santa Isabel, and the solar 
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farm in Guayama52. Since then, not much progress has been made and the utility was never able 
to meet the RPS obligations set forth in Act 82 – current figures sit at 40% oil, 39% natural gas, 
18% coal, and 2.3% from renewables53.  
In 2014, recognizing PREPA’s inability to meet its RPS goals and follow through with 
promised improvements, then-governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla pushed forth a new statute aimed 
to better oversee the electric utility with mechanisms included to hold it more accountable. The 
result was Act 57 of 2014 that led to the creation of the State Office of Public Energy Policy 
(OEPPE) and the Puerto Rico Energy Commission (PREC). This law would serve as the legal 
framework to allow these two entities to operate as the utility’s Regulators54. The change would 
fundamentally transform the relationship that PREPA had with the local government, whereas it 
had previously acted with separate decision-making authority, the OEPPE and PREC institutions 
would now control the decision-making process and long-term strategic objectives of PREPA. 
Shortly after its inception, OEPPE released a summary report in 2014 highlighting some of its key 
drivers (energy conservation, energy efficiency, and energy autonomy).  
This report placed special emphasis on the need for Puerto Rico to harness its solar and 
wind resources so it could strengthen its sovereignty by relying less on external sources for its 
energy security, furthermore laying out the expectation that they were going to continue to comply 
with the RPS55. The increase of renewable energy on a larger scale had received some pushback 
from PREPA officials suggesting that the grid could not support the increase due to its variable 
nature and the impact it would have on factors such as frequency and voltage regulation. In 
cooperation with its new regulators, PREPA hired Siemens to conduct an independent study of 
Puerto Rico’s grid and its ability to integrate more renewable generation.  
Siemens published two studies (2014 & 2015), building off of an earlier finding from the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in 201356, concluding that Puerto Rico’s grid 
could in fact handle a significant increase in renewable energy assuming that they would also 
 
52 “A World Class Corporation Main Projects Overview.” Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 2013, p. 45  
53 “Puerto Rico Territory Profile Overview.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020 
54 “Act No. 57 of 27 May 2014: Puerto Rico Energy Transformation and RELIEF Act.” Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
Legislature, 27 May 2014, p. 103 
55 “State of the Country's Energy Situation 2014 Report.” Puerto Rico State Office of Public Energy Policy, 28 
February 2015, pp. 19-22 
56 Gevorgian, Vahan, and Sarah Booth. “Review of PREPA Technical Requirements for Interconnecting Wind and 
Solar Generation.” National Renewable Energy Laboratory, November 2013 
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invest in the necessary protection and control equipment, enabling the flexibility to accommodate 
the variable nature of solar and wind energy57. If the utility took the initiative to invest in new 
protective relays, substation transformer load-tap-changing (LTC) controllers, and voltage 
regulators then it is believed with high confidence that PREPA could introduce up to 884 
megawatts (MW) of renewable energy – approximately 25% of its total electrical demand58. These 
studies helped invalidate the excuses utility officials had been making as the reason for their 
inability to meet distributed generation goals, while also establishing the legitimacy of the RPS 
mandates and their technical feasibility. Unfortunately, before the regulators had the opportunity 
to implement more aggressive measures to roll out new renewable energy projects, details would 
emerge of further corruption and mismanagement by PREPA officials that would essentially halt 
any progress the local government was determined to make. 
A scandal broke out in March of 2016 when a local news organization published a story 
alleging major corruption and financial mismanagement at PREPA by claiming that some of its 
officials had intentionally been overpaying fuel suppliers for low quality oil that was used in its 
power plants59. This fraud was alleged to have occurred over decades and stated officials had 
received kickbacks for the purchasing of fuel oil from private dealers which accounted for more 
than 50% of PREPA’s annual operational budgets60. The corruption and financial mismanagement 
came to a head later in 2016 when the U.S. federal government enacted its own piece of legislature 
referred to as the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), 
that laid the foundation for the federal government to take controllership of the island and its 
finances.  
Up to this point, PREPA had continued to operate under a yearly deficit that led to the 
accumulation of over $9,000M of debt, serving as a microcosm for the Puerto Rico government, 
which had also been operating under a deficit. PROMESA formed an independent Financial 
Oversight and Management Board (FOMB) which uncovered that the territorial government had 
 
57 “Integrated Resource Plan Volume V: Evaluation of DG Impacts on the Distribution System.” Siemens: Prepared 
for the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 30 September 2015, pp. 5-1 – 5-2 (111-12) 
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amassed financial obligations of more than $120,000M from the issuance of debt bonds and 
pension liabilities61. PREPA’s accounting and business practices were further scrutinized and 
brought into question when it was revealed that they were subsidizing the power consumption of 
numerous other public institutions, allowing them not to pay for the electricity they were using 
and then passing the costs on to the rest of the rate payers62. PREPA’s annual reports had 
highlighted the outstanding debts owed to them in accounts receivable, totaling hundreds of 
millions of dollars, from institutions such as the Department of Education, Aqueducts and Sewer 
Authority, Port Authority, Public Building Authority, Urban Train Administration, and Medical 
Services Administration63.  
PREPA had established a precedent where city governments, schools, transportation 
systems, and hospitals were practically exempt from paying for their own electricity64. After 
observing the grave mismanagement from PREPA and the local government, the FOMB put a halt 
to any capital expenditures and implemented measures of austerity to try and curb the impacts of 
running a massive deficit65. PREPA was on the precipice of bankruptcy, its grid in a weak and 
vulnerable position with no budget to replace aging infrastructure. The electric utility had 
demonstrated that it was in no position to manage its own organization; finally, the years of 
corruption, financial mishandling, inability to meet mandates, failure to follow through with plans 
for improvement, and listen to the recommendations of other subject matter experts had led to a 
catastrophic demise where it was forced to stand idle while outsiders tried to comprehend the 
entirety of its ineptitude. We see a similar pattern of behavior from PREPA in the way that they 
managed the infrastructure on the two island municipalities of Vieques and Culebra, characterized 
by a litany of broken promises and failure to follow through with improvements to their section of 
the grid.  
 
 
61 “Final Investigative Report.” Independent Investigator Kobre & Kim LLP: Prepared for The Financial Oversight & 
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PREPA’s Failures with Island Municipalities  
In 2011, the government of Puerto Rico’s Department of Economic and Commercial 
Development, with cooperation and input from local grassroots organizations, published a Master 
Plan for the Sustainable Development of Vieques and Culebra that intended to serve as a guiding 
document for the island municipalities’ future development. An important focus of this document 
was on infrastructure improvements to the electrical grid and how it could transform its system to 
become cleaner, more efficient, and more independent66. Authorities identified the vulnerable 
nature of the power system for these two islands and recognized that changes would have to be 
made in order to adequately prepare these communities for the risk of having to rely on submarine 
cables to meet the local demand of electricity. Recommendations were set and strategies outlined 
to include the construction of utility-scale renewable energy plants (wind and solar) and 
improvements to substations and other supplementary devices that would allow the islands to 
sustain their electrical demand in the event of a disruption to the submarine cables67.  
The Master Plan described how these projects would ensure the continuity of services and 
administration in the case of a larger blackout on the mainland of Puerto Rico, and how they would 
reduce the overall dependence on fuel oil in the region while at the same time reducing carbon 
emissions. PREPA’s contingency plan in the event of a loss of power from the mainland was, and 
still is, to use backup generators on the island municipalities until normal service could be restored. 
The problem with this plan was that PREPA never completed the installation of two emergency 
backup generators it had brought to Culebra in 2010. These generators sat idle within Culebra’s 
sole substation for seven years as a legal battle played out between the electric utility and the 
contractor hired to oversee the project68. The position of these idle generators from PREPA and 
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Figure 1.8 – Culebra’s Substation After Hurricane Maria with Old and New Generators 
PREPA never complied with the objectives of the Master Plan, nor with their own contingency 
plan, leaving Vieques and Culebra in a heightened state of vulnerability with regards to their 
electrical supply.  
We see yet another instance of failure to follow through with improvements in 2014 when 
then-governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla enacted Law 26 of 2014 which set out a 10-year plan to 
transform Culebra into the first energy independent island municipality in Puerto Rico69. The law 
created a special commission for the purpose of rolling out 11 detailed initiatives that would 
accomplish this goal, referred to as Environmental Pioneer 10-year Plan for Culebra. The first two 
initiatives were to make Culebra energy self-sufficient and waste neutral, and to construct 
renewable energy plants, respectively. The government had earmarked approximately $10M to 
achieve the 11 goals, with half of that going towards the upgrade of electrical infrastructure so the 
grid could tolerate the planned renewable energy70. After building excitement around the new plan 
and mobilizing resources, local elections were held in 2016 which resulted in the changing of 
administrations. There was a new political party in charge of Puerto Rico, with a new governor 
and new executive directors of most public institutions71 coinciding with the rule of the Financial 
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Oversight and Management Board. Sadly, work for the Environmental Pioneer 10-year Plan for 
Culebra went undone and was never heard from again. As a result of systemic failures to modernize 
infrastructure, properly manage a budget, stick to improvement plans and develop innovative 
projects, the island of Puerto Rico and its two island municipalities were left with high risk of, and 
vulnerability to, a large-scale blackout from an extreme weather event, which the island was 
exposed to in 2017 during Hurricane Maria. Officials had failed to understand the magnitude of 
their decisions in not upgrading and hardening the grid but were made quite clear of the 
consequences once the storm hit. 
 
Second Chances 
 In an ironic turn of events, precisely because of Hurricane Maria and the damage sustained 
to the island’s grid, Puerto Rico is placed in a unique position to have another chance at building 
a more resilient and sustainable power system. Despite past failures, Puerto Rico now has the 
opportunity to assemble a new grid from scratch with the help of federal agencies and funding, 
galvanized public support and political will, guidance and technical assistance from international 
corporations, while also leveraging the benefits of having had the time for new technologies to 
mature and reduce in price. Although the storm had produced estimated damages to the island as 
a whole in excess of $90,000M72, the United Sates government decided to allocate a considerable 
amount of federal relief funding to help with the island’s recovery efforts.  
It took a few years to assess total damages and apportion the necessary funds in Congress, 
but in September of 2020 the U.S. government, through FEMA, awarded the island $13,000M to 
spend on reconstruction, with an additional $9,000M authorized for release later down the road, 
bringing the total financial commitment of the federal government to more than $26,000M – the 
only natural disasters to receive more federal funding were Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane 
Sandy73. Out of the $13,000M awarded to Puerto Rico, $9,600M was specifically reserved for 
PREPA and improvements to the grid. Once the island began to transition away from disaster 
recovery and their situation had stabilized, the U.S. government was able to provide further 
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assistance from federal agencies in the form of guidance, analysis, and recommendations for future 
actions and how best to approach the rebuilding period. The Department of Energy (DOE) made 
specific recommendations for the diversification and decentralization of energy sources, as well 
as accelerating the deployment of microgrids by establishing reasonable and attainable regulations 
surrounding their implementation74. Similar recommendations were echoed by private 
corporations and institutions motivated to help the island’s energy transition.  
Siemens prepared a report for the island’s government in 2018 that analyzed the grid’s 
ability to be broken up into 10 smaller minigrids, presented in Figure 1.9, that if needed, could 
operate independently of the larger grid by having their own sources of generation, automation, 
and control equipment75.  
 
 
Figure 1.9 – Siemens’ 2018 Proposal for Minigrid Design Puerto Rico Electric Power System 
To achieve the recommended designs would require a significant undertaking since many of the 
minigrids do not contain any generation within their proposed footprints. Remember, that most of 
Puerto Rico’s generation sources are located in relatively few pockets on the island, reflecting the 
nature of a centralized grid. The recommendations state each minigrid should be supplied by a 
combination of smaller fossil-fueled generators, renewable energy installations, and battery 
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storage, which they opined would allow the greatest resiliency through reduced dependence on 
large, concentrated power plants76. With this model, small communities could shield themselves 
from the effects of traditional centralized grid disturbances that result in voltage collapse or 
frequency decay and cascading outages – typically leading to island-wide blackouts. Disturbances 
could theoretically be contained to the individual minigrids in which they occur, or in the event of 
a much larger disturbance, such as a natural disaster, personnel could repair the damaged 
infrastructure within their minigrid and immediately begin to supply power, not having to rely on 
the restoration of large faraway power plants and long-distance transmission lines.  
Industry experts from a variety of institutions have published studies of PREPA’s network 
and how it responded to Hurricane Maria, with comparable recommendations on a future rebuild. 
The New York Power Authority (NYPA) was one of the main organizations, along with FEMA 
and USACE, that were involved in the immediate restoration of power in Puerto Rico following 
the hurricane. NYPA also supplied the government of Puerto Rico and PREPA with a report in 
late 2017 that urged the island and its utility company to invest heavily in renewable energy for 
distributed generation, microgrids, upgrading of structures to higher standards to withstand at least 
Category 4 hurricanes, the burying of conductors as opposed to overhead wires, and elevation of 
the majority of substation elements around the coast that were susceptible to flooding77. NYPA 
estimated the overall cost to rebuild the grid in a more resilient fashion at $17,000M, most of which 
was allocated to the strengthening and storm hardening of 3 areas – $9,000M for T&D assets, 
$3,000M for large power plants, and $1,600M for substations78. In addition to these 3 areas, NYPA 
advocated the expenditure of another $1,500M towards the new construction of renewable energy 
and microgrids to help transition towards a decentralized system, in the belief that microgrids 
could become the key to a more resilient power system79.  
 The damage from Hurricane Maria and the international community’s reaction worked to 
galvanize the island and its government officials, who then began to release their own assessments 
with the goal of establishing long-term strategies to rebuild their grid and make it more resilient. 
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The government began by passing Act 17 of 2019 that mandated new RPS targets and set forth a 
requirement that PREPA create a new Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for approval by PREC, the 
local energy commission. The new RPS targets state that the island will move towards achieving 
a renewable energy supply of 40% by 2025, 60% by 2040, and 100% by 205080. Act 17 lays out 
the expectation that the island’s grid will be supplied entirely from renewable sources by 2050, 
following in the footsteps of several U.S. states (Hawaii, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Arizona, 
California, Florida, Virginia, etc.)81. Act 17 also establishes the regulatory framework to help 
support and develop specific industries and technologies for penetration into the grid, including 
renewable energy and distributed generation, as well as microgrids, and finally a component to 
add competition to, and privatization of, the energy markets82.  
The increase in political will, stakeholder support, federal oversight, and subject matter 
expert recommendations have already led to tangible improvements with the privatization of T&D 
operations and maintenance (O+M) work83, as well as the roll out of Requests for Proposal’s 
(RFP’s) to develop/install large private and independent generators on Vieques and Culebra to 
potentially power their portion of the grid independently84. Aside from government support and 
industry expertise, the energy sector in Puerto Rico, and renewables in particular, can benefit more 
than ever by having had the time for these technologies to mature in terms of both cost and 
efficiency. If you look at Figure 1.10, you can see wind and solar technologies have made leaps 
and bounds over the last 10 years with the reductions in total cost and increases in capacity and 
efficiency, setting a trend that shows renewable energy technology becoming cheaper while also 
producing more energy85.  
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Figure 1.10 – International Renewable Energy Agency 2020 Data & Statistics: Global Trends 
This trend has significantly outpaced every other energy supply technology currently used except 
for natural gas combined-cycle power plants, which have mostly benefitted from decreasing 
natural gas prices. The advances in technology create the perfect opportunity for the island to 
capitalize on their excellent wind and solar natural resources, for PREPA to take a leadership 
position during their power system rebuild and actually develop a more resilient and sustainable 
grid.  
We can now see a combination of factors that make this a very interesting time for PREPA, 
and the energy landscape of Puerto Rico as a whole. The embattled electric utility, with the 
hindsight of having been able to observe the weak performance of their network during and after 
the hurricane season of 2017, share the unique wisdom of understanding they have a very brittle 
and unreliable grid. Yet at the same time, PREPA is experiencing unprecedented support in their 
efforts to rebuild from local politicians, federal agencies, and private enterprise. The time is right 
for Puerto Rico to harness this synergy and actually follow through with expert recommendations, 
so they can take full advantage of the opportunity afforded them by disaster funding and matured 
technology. Although PREPA has a history of failure, spanning several sectors, they have the 
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distinctive ability to redeem themselves by leading the energy transition and assembling a 
decentralized grid with the rollout of renewable energy, flexible controls, and storage so the people 
of Puerto Rico can realize the benefits of a more reliable and resilient grid. This is a region where 
climate change is having a significant impact, where weather events will intensify, and a stronger 
grid is needed to shield the people from some of the harsher consequences felt by natural disasters 
in the form of damage to critical infrastructure and power loss. Nowhere is this more deserved than 
on the two island municipalities, Culebra and Vieques, who for decades have been petitioning to 
upgrade their electrical infrastructure, for the energy independence that was promised them long 






































Culebra Solar Farm Project Development and Feasibility 
 
Project Overview and Introduction  
 After completing an analysis of PREPA’s challenges over the last 10 years and evaluating 
subsequent industry recommendations, we know that the island of Puerto Rico is capable of, and 
determined to, accelerate the development of renewable energy to supply portions of their 
electrical demand.  Experts conclude that the island’s power system can handle a much higher 
penetration of these technologies, such as wind and solar, and may actually be necessary in order 
to fortify the resiliency of the grid by decentralizing power supplies. This decentralization supports 
a network configuration that compartmentalizes itself into smaller micro/minigrids that would 
make it possible to restore power significantly faster after major disturbances to the grid, especially 
natural disasters. A local community that would benefit tremendously from having a [cleaner, more 
reliable] local power supply is the island municipality of Culebra, and in this spirit, we will be 
evaluating the potential to develop and install a utility-scale solar photovoltaic farm on the island. 
Before we examine the possibility of constructing this type of infrastructure on Culebra, we must 
first present a set of assumptions and limitations that we will be working from in this study due to 
the defined scope and preliminary nature of this paper.  
There are many unknowns in this case study, and we will be working with the restriction 
of not knowing what the specific ampacity and cable ratings are of the two submarine lines that 
transport energy from mainland Puerto Rico to Vieques, and Vieques to Culebra. These are 
important to know for adequately sizing your solar farm and assessing the viability of exporting 
excess power from Culebra towards Vieques or even mainland Puerto Rico. We also do not know 
what the specific electrical consumption of Culebra is on a per year basis in kilowatt hours; we 
only know the combined yearly consumption of both Vieques and Culebra is 46,500,000 kWh86 
and that the peak demand of Culebra is 2.2MW87 (the greatest amount of electrical demand at any 
one time). Since the capacity of the cables and yearly consumption on Culebra is not publicly 
available, we are working under the assumption that the submarine cables will be able to sustain 
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the flow of any excess power away from Culebra, and within reason that the production from a 
10MW solar farm will be able to supply most of, if not all, the demand on the small island.  
Another limitation of this paper is that the study of energy storage (sizing and technologies) 
will not be explored in detail as it lies outside the scope of this analysis. Energy storage is 
extremely valuable in mitigating issues with voltage and frequency regulation, ramping, and 
transient ride-through often experienced with variable generation and must be explored further to 
determine a more substantive approach or design for establishing energy independence in Culebra. 
The modular composition of storage though, make any future evaluation relatively straightforward. 
Additionally, during economic projections we mention the use of current financial incentives that 
may change in the future or be eliminated altogether, such as the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) and 
Solar Renewable Energy Certificates (SREC’s). Lastly, the three sites chosen for production 
modeling were selected based off publicly listed open plots of land for sale in Culebra at the time 
this study was produced and may no longer be available as potential sites for purchase or 
development.  
 We will be evaluating sites and assessing feasibility from the Initiating phase and process 
group of the Project Management discipline, and thus from this point of view we are only 
considering preliminary analysis of such a project and if it is worth exploring in more detail88. 
Since our primary objective is to better understand the probability of successfully initiating and 
building a solar farm on Culebra, we will be conducting more of an analysis on topics such as 
natural solar resources, production modeling, business case, and market forces, and not the 
implementation of this endeavor, so we will not be covering topics that list specific vendors, 
procurement strategies, logistics, schedule timelines, or cost breakdowns. An examination was 
made under the guidance of a project charter that defined success as ‘the construction of a 10MW 
solar photovoltaic farm that contributed to the reliability, resiliency, and energy independence of 
Culebra, was profitable in nature, had minimal ecological impact, and directly benefitted the local 
residents.’   
 
 
88 “A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide).” 6th ed. Newtown Square, Pa.: 




Natural Solar Resources and Irradiance 
 Utilizing two independent and reputable satellite sensing solar natural resource data bases 
we are able to conclude that Puerto Rico, and Culebra in particular have remarkable, above average 
solar irradiance resources – at approximate coordinates of 18° latitude, -65° longitude. We see on 
Figure _____’s left hand side information from World Bank sponsored SolarGIS site that displays 
Global Horizontal Irradiance (GHI) occurrence on Puerto Rico and Culebra, reporting kilowatt 
hours per square meter (kWh/m²) both in terms of daily and yearly averages in excess of ~6 and 
2,115 respectively89. We confirm this using Figure 2.1’s right hand side graphs, taken from 
NASA’s Langley Research Center Power Data Access Viewer tool indicating that the daily GHI 
totals range from 4 to 7 on average with slight variability throughout the year as the seasons 
fluctuate, experiencing 7 kWh/m² the most with just under 80 days out of the year90. GHI is the 
single most effective parameter used to assess natural solar resources and solar production 
potential at any particular site91. The two data base sets mentioned earlier signify exceptional 




89 “Prospect Solar Global Horizontal Irradiance GIS Viewer.” SolarGIS, 2020 
90 “Power Data Access Viewer: Prediction of Worldwide Energy Resources (Coordinates 18.18, -65.16).” NASA 
Langley Research Center, 2020 
91 a) Neill, Susan, et al. “Solar Farms: The Earthscan Expert Guide to Design and Construction of Utility-Scale 
Photovoltaic Systems.” New York, Ny.: Routledge, 2017. p.55   
b) “Utility-Scale Solar Photovoltaic Power Plants: A Project Developer's Guide.” International Finance Corporation 




Figure 2.1 – Natural Solar Resources in Puerto Rico. Left Half: GHI Data from SolarGIS Prospect Map | Right Half: kWh/m² Data 
from NASA Langley Research Center Power Data Access Viewer Tool 
 
Site Selection 
 Three local sites on Culebra were selected to perform production modeling calculations 
and forecasting. These sites were chosen from a list of publicly available open plots of land for 
sale, accessible via internet from a variety of real estate sources. Locations with 30+ acres of 
available land were preferred due to the area requirements for solar photovoltaic installations, on 
average requiring approximate 3 acres to develop a 1MW installation92, thus 10MW solar farm 
would require 30+ acres to build. The sites are relatively equidistant to the lone substation on 
Culebra, of which any development would need to interconnect with – all 3 sites averaging about 
a two-mile distance travel to the substation, using existing roads through which to construct a path. 
You can see each site’s relative geographic position to the substation, as well as to each other in 
Figure 2.2. A quick summary of these plots is provided below next to the Figures for each parcel. 
 
 
92 “Utility-Scale Solar Photovoltaic Power Plants: A Project Developer's Guide.” International Finance Corporation 




Figure 2.2 – Bird’s Eye View Culebra Island with Proposed Solar Photovoltaic Sites and Substation 
 
 
Site 1 is located in the Frailes neighborhood of 
Culebra, situated on the eastern end of the island 
just north of Honda Bay, its perimeter drawn in red 
almost a horizontal rectangular shape seen in 
Figure 2.3. The plot encompasses a total of 31 acres 
and is for sale at $2.8M93. The land itself is open, 
free of obstructions and any major vegetation aside 
from small shrubbery, with a slight slope in tilt 
facing north about 25°. The site is also next to a 






93 “32 Cuerdas (31 Acres) Barrio Frailes Culebra.” Clasificados De Puerto Rico Online, 2020 





Site 2 is located in the San 
Isidro neighborhood of 
Culebra, sitting just a few 
hundred feet northwest of 
Site 1 in Frailes. The 
property lines show an 
atypical boundary, most 
closely resembling a left 
facing boot, seen in Figure 2.4. The plot encompasses a total of 70 acres and is for sale at $2.1M94. 
The land is free of major obstruction and also nestled along major access Road #250. The land sits 
within a small valley characterized by a slight slope, southwardly facing at a tilt of about 20°.  
 
 
Site 3 is located in the Playa Sardinas neighborhood of 
Culebra, situated on the southeastern portion of the island, 
south of Honda Bay. The property holds a similar 
rectangular shape as the land at Site 1, with a 60° angle at 
its base pointing west, or having an azimuth of 210° as 
seen highlighted in blue in Figure 2.5. The plot 
encompasses a total of 39 acres and is for sale at $1.2M95. 
This land is also free of major obstruction, sits along route 
Playa Sardinas II, and may be the least visible of the three 
sites as it lies in the southeast quadrant of the island facing mostly south away from any residential 
developments. Much of the terrain at this site slopes southwardly at 30°.  
 
 
94 “# 250, Culebra, PR 00775.” Realtor.com, 2020 
95 “Lot #26 - Bo Playa Sardinera.” Island Realty: Culebra, Puerto Rico, 2020 
Figure 2.4 – San Isidro Land Boundary 




 With the use of cloud based solar design and production modeling software, we were able 
to simulate with a moderate degree of accuracy the estimated electrical production capability of 
solar farms at each site utilizing similar conditions and technologies but taking specific land 
properties into account. The conditions we used across each site include same capacity solar panels 
and inverters, and the same Inverter Loading Ratio (ILR), or DC/AC ratio. Each site was designed 
to have 28,800 350W solar panels, connected to 162 50kW inverters. This configuration 
represented a total DC nameplate capacity of 10.1MW and an AC capacity of 8.1MW, which 
equates to roughly a 1.24 ILR – the optimal ratio by most sizing standards96. The azimuth, tilt, and 
shape of solar panel array layouts were adjusted slightly to correspond to the natural landscapes of 
each site, dictated by the sloping terrains and property boundaries. After designing the systems 
and incorporating the different values for each parameter in solar modeling software program 
HelioScope, we ran the them through simulations in the program to calculate estimates of yearly 
production totals. To validate these estimates, we compared them with simulations run in PVWatts, 
an independent preliminary analysis program built by NREL, which calculated its own set of 
yearly production figures. We found similar production estimates across both platforms, displaying 
consistent results for each site. The variability between programs yielded a delta of between 
100,000 – 300,000 kWh/year and predicted system losses of 5-7%. The yearly production totals 
of kilowatt hours produced for each site on Culebra are listed below in Figure 2.6. For more 
detailed information regarding design components, monthly breakdown, system losses, one-




Figure 2.6 – HelioScope and PVWatts Production Modeling Results 
  
 
96 a) Fiorelli, Jon, and Michael Zuercher-Martinson. “Supersize It: How Oversizing Our Array-to-Inverter Ratio Can 
Improve Solar-Power System Performance.” Solar Power World, no. 7, 2013, pp. 42–46. Inverter Insider.  
b) “The Ideal Inverter Loading Ratio (ILR) for Commercial and Utility Solar Plants.” BlueOak Energy, 18 November 
2015 
Location HelioScope Production Est. (kWh/yr) PVWatts Production Est. (kWh/yr)
Site 1 Frailes 14,038,555 13,693,421
Site 2 San Isidro 14,984,300 14,790,004




 In order for most development projects to be successful and sustainable, especially ones 
undertaken by private enterprise, they must make business sense and be justified economically. 
The projects must sustain themselves financially and even have some rate of return comparable to 
other investment strategies in order to motivate organizations to develop and build these types of 
infrastructure projects. No entity, aside from perhaps government, will proactively initiate or move 
forward with a project that will knowingly result in a financial loss. So, working with this 
framework, we must evaluate the potential economic implications of building a solar farm on 
Culebra and decide whether it will sustain itself and even generate enough revenue to make a 
reasonable return on investment. To complete an initial calculation, we must assess the project’s 
possible costs and revenue, using the information we have and the production modeling we 
completed previously.   
 We can sum up total costs associated with utility-scale solar photovoltaic projects by 
utilizing industry assumptions commonly deployed during preliminary assessments. These 
assumptions typically apply a dollar value to every watt constructed, referencing industry average 
costs in dollars per watt ($/W) that can then be scaled up and applied to the size of your proposed 
system. This dollar figure includes the costs associated with the solar panels, inverters, balance of 
plant (BoP) components, engineering procurement and construction (EPC), and other ancillary 
expenses. The total cost to install large solar systems has steadily decreased over the last 10 years, 
coinciding with a drop in the cost to manufacture solar panels, and current industry estimates place 
that cost at about $2 per watt97.  
A recent NREL study that looked at energy resilience options for Culebra states that after 
speaking with several solar developers in Puerto Rico, they were able to determine and settle on 
an average cost of $2.15 per watt ($2.15/W) and this is the figure we will use in our financial 
calculations98. Next, we will multiply this figure by DC nameplate capacity of our proposed system 
– the DC capacity of our HelioScope designs are 10.1 million watts, so 10.1 million multiplied by 
$2.15 comes out to $21.715M, the cost to theoretically construct our proposed solar farm on the 
island of Culebra. If we apply a cost of $16 per kilowatt for operations and maintenance (O+M) 
 
97 Neill, Susan, et al. “Solar Farms: The Earthscan Expert Guide to Design and Construction of Utility-Scale 
Photovoltaic Systems.” New York, Ny.: Routledge, 2017. p.64 
98 Salasovich, James, and Gail Mosey. “Energy Resilience Assessment for Culebra, Puerto Rico.” National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, June 2019, p.8 
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expenses99 (our overhead), and then multiply that by the project lifecycle, we get a total operational 
expense of $4.04M over 25 years. When we add the costs to develop and operate the solar farm 
over a 25-year period, we come up with an estimated total cost of $25.755M. After applying the 
individual costs of the land for each site, we see that total cost estimates climb to Site 1 Frailes – 
$28.555M, Site 2 San Isidro – $27.855M, and Site 3 Playa Sardinas – $26.955M.  
 Now that we have preliminary indicators of what the total cost may be to build one of 
these systems on Culebra, we will calculate the potential revenue we may generate by constructing 
the solar farm. Most renewable energy installations generate revenue by entering into a long-term 
contract with an offtaker, or a purchaser, of the electricity that your system produces. For utility-
scale systems, these are most often the local electric utility, or PREPA in our case, and are applied 
through the execution of a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). PPA’s are used as legally binding 
contracts that reduce overall risk to the developers and financiers of these projects by providing 
the security of long-term revenue projections. They state what price the developer has agreed to 
sell, and the electric company has agreed to pay, for every kilowatt hour produced by the 
installation, typically for every year of the contract. Historical records show PREPA’s past PPA’s 
with solar developers in the range of $0.11-$0.14 cents per kilowatt hour100, and thus we will use 
$0.12/kWh as the basis for our long-term revenue projections, as these also align with current 
estimates of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) for renewable energy projects101. These long-
term projections are applied to each site in Figure 2.7.   
 
 
Figure 2.7 – Preliminary Financial Calculations of Potential Revenue 
 
 
99 Salasovich, James, and Gail Mosey. “Energy Resilience Assessment for Culebra, Puerto Rico.” National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory, June 2019, p. 10 
100 “Integrated Resource Plan: Appendix 3 Renewable Energy Project Status.” Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, 
December 2018 
101 NREL LCOE calculator and Solar Farms – Earthscan expert guide to design and construction of utility-scale PV 
systems p. 64 
Location Production Est. (kWh/yr) Yearly Revenue Est. 
Total Revenue Est. with 
25-year PPA 
Site 1 Frailes 14,038,555 $1,684,627 $42,115,665
Site 2 San Isidro 14,984,300 $1,798,116 $44,952,900
Site 3 Playa Sardinas 14,621,100 $1,754,532 $43,863,300
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 For simplicity’s sake, we will not account for escalation clauses or diminishing production 
from solar panel degradation in our PPA estimates with reference to revenue collection and system 
production, respectively, over an assumed 25-year lifecycle with the understanding that these 
variables are likely to cancel each other out over the duration of the contract. Since we are not 
using compounding quantities like revenue escalation and degradation, we will employ Return on 
Investment (ROI) and Simple Payback Periods to carry out rudimentary financial calculations to 
assess the feasibility of each site. See Figure 2.8 for a breakdown of these categories for all three 
sites.    
 
 
Figure 2.8 – Preliminary Financial Calculations of ROI and Payback Period 
 After applying the data from the simulations to cost and revenue projections, one can easily 
interpret based off these calculations that developing a solar farm on Culebra would make solid 
business sense; the figures we see from the ROI and Payback Period are quite lucrative and 
outperform investments in other sectors like the stock market or real estate102. Although these 
estimates indicate profitable returns from the development of a large solar farm, it should be 
approached with caution and used only as the starting point for more thorough and detailed 
calculations involving additional variables. For example, with our cost and revenue projections, 
we have not taken into account the impact of available incentives for renewable energy projects 
such as the U.S. federal Investment Tax Credit (ITC) which can be leveraged to reduce the overall 
cost of developing your project by up to 26%103! Another potential incentive that could be explored 
further is the issuance of Solar Renewable Energy Certificates (SREC’s) that solar energy 
infrastructure can accumulate based off production totals, and then sold at a later date to utilities 
trying to comply with RPS mandates104. Alternatively, just as we have not included some potential 
revenue streams, we have also left out some areas of expense that can be accrued by projects of 
 
102 a) “U.S. Market Activity Indexes.” Nasdaq, 2020 
b) “Office of Policy Development and Research: National Housing Market Summary.” U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development, 2020 
103 “Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC).” U.S. Solar Energy Industries Association, 2020 
104 “Solar Renewable Energy Certificate (SREC) Trade Market.” Superior Clean Energy Management, 2020 
Location Return on Investment Simple Payback (years) 
Site 1 Frailes 47.49% 16.95
Site 2 San Isidro 61.38% 15.49
Site 3 Playa Sardinas 62.73% 15.36
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this magnitude. Due to the highly variable nature of some expenses, we have left topics such as 
substation upgrades, taxes, local charitable contributions, and decommissioning costs out of our 
equations.  
 
Market Analysis  
 The energy landscape in Puerto Rico has had quite a turbulent history characterized by a 
litany of controversy, though where there is instability there is also opportunity. We have seen 
proposals for many projects in the territory come and go, often with the result of failure to break 
ground, but with the foresight to look ahead and consider the trajectory of the industry and the 
transformation PREPA is undergoing, one can see that there is definitely an opening to get 
involved and enter the energy market in Puerto Rico. Ever since the hurricanes of 2017 we have 
been witnessing a major shift in the public discourse on energy policy and the way it will 
eventually be implemented. There is tremendous political will on the island to improve their 
electrical infrastructure, anchored by global criticisms of past administrations, management of the 
power system, and how vulnerable it was to natural disaster.  
Under the guidance of the federal Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB), 
local leaders have been championing the need to develop and install more resilient energy 
infrastructure and at unprecedented levels. Responding to Siemens’ 2018 recommendation of 
creating minigrids, powered in part by renewable energy, the island has been focusing on efforts 
to finalize an Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for PREPA that emphasizes the rollout of solar and 
wind energy. The final version of this IRP will look to expedite the permitting of large-scale 
renewable energy projects, reduce barriers to entry, and offer financial incentives and tax breaks 
for developers looking to build these projects105. The demand and appetite for renewable energy 
and microgrid technology is certainly growing stronger. A proposal for a utility-scale solar farm 
on Culebra, marketed as a driver of growth for the island and the cornerstone of its energy 
independence, would be positively received and align with current sentiments on energy reform.  
 The resident population on Culebra is very ecologically conscious and having had to deal 
with resource scarcity and dependence on outside forces, have become accustomed to managing 
local issues through the lens of sustainability. The population understands what type of changes in 
 
105 “Review of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority Integrated Resource Plan.” Government of Puerto Rico 
Public Service Regulatory Board of Puerto Rico Energy Bureau, 24 August 2020. pp. 100-35 and 260-70 
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energy infrastructure are needed to reach the goal of independence, and as long as construction 
efforts are contained and have minimal disruptions to the local environment, it is the belief that 
the people of Culebra would support a project of this nature and magnitude. It could serve as a 
source of revitalization for a group of people increasingly fatigued by failures of the local electric 
company, and further catalyze the movement towards cleaner, decentralized power supplies. There 
have been failed clean energy projects on Culebra in the past and it will be important to include 
the local population early on in any development plans so as not to alienate them, as was 
experienced previously with an onshore wind power proposal106. Transparency is a key component 
for success when working with local stakeholders on developing infrastructure projects in their 
communities. It will be necessary to work closely with several stakeholders during the 
development of this project and analyzing their receptiveness to these types of endeavors is one of 
many indicators that reveal whether the market is suitable to build a solar farm.  
 After gauging whether the local residents would support a solar farm on Culebra, the first 
stakeholder you must develop a relationship with is PREPA. You will need to work with them 
from the very beginning of the project up until the very end, and even beyond as they will be the 
primary offtaker of the energy you produce. The PPA will be the single most important document 
that you must obtain and will become the foundation of your project107. It will dictate many 
elements, especially outside funding, and may contain the scope, requirements, lines of 
demarcation, and revenue structure of the solar farm so it will be crucial to develop a strong 
relationship with PREPA from the very beginning of your project during the initiating phase. The 
PPA will likely coincide with an Interconnection Service Agreement (ISA) that deals with all of 
the technical aspects of the infrastructure and will authorize you to connect to their transmission 
system. PREPA will also be responsible for carrying out engineering studies before the project can 
be built, as well as the commissioning and acceptance testing when the solar farm is ready to come 
online. They will hold an integral role in the development of any energy project in Puerto Rico, 
and although past executives have made questionable decisions, the field engineers and planners 
tasked with these jobs are generally very skillful and thorough.  
 
106 “Flamenco Wind Farm a No-Go.” National Wind Watch Puerto Rico, 13 May 2013 
107 “Utility-Scale Solar Photovoltaic Power Plants: A Project Developer's Guide.” International Finance Corporation 
(World Bank Group), 2015, p. 44 
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 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) may have to get involved as well, depending 
on the proximity of the solar farm to past military installations as there were several on Culebra, 
so as to certify that the area is clear of old munitions108. In addition to PREPA and the USACE, a 
variety of regulatory and environmental organizations will have to approve and sign off on this 
type of project. The major governing body for development activities on Culebra is the 
Conservation and Development Authority of Culebra (ACDEC); they will have to be engaged 
early and convinced this project will benefit the local population before approving your project 
and supplying the local permits. A development plan must contain a solid Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) that address ecological impacts to the area, and any remedies to mitigate them. 
ACDEC is most concerned with the economic development and environmental sustainability of 
the island (ecotourism is the main economic driver), so they must be persuaded that a solar farm 
will contribute positively to the local economy, through jobs or yearly financial contributions, and 
will not destroy the environment. The Board of Environmental Quality (JCA) and the Department 
of Natural Resources and Environment (DRNA) will also have to endorse your EIS and support 
your proposal before it can gain approval. These two entities are primarily focused on 
environmental impacts and considering there are not many sensitive specimens on the island, aside 
from nesting sea turtles, it should be relatively simple to accommodate impacted flora and fauna.  
 The competitive landscape in renewable energy sector is moderate in Puerto Rico, with a 
mix of local and foreign companies having a foothold in the territory. Many U.S. based clean 
energy companies have chosen Puerto Rico as a preferred location to open regional headquarters 
as they try to enter the Caribbean market. These larger development companies often partner with 
local installers to construct their projects, and this is no different in Puerto Rico. Led by a strong 
and competent renewable energy business association (ACONER)109, Puerto Rico is home to a 
variety of highly qualified engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) companies and local 
installers. These companies and business association should be considered as collaborators, and 
not necessarily competitors. The engineering and construction disciplines on the island host a large 
consortium of qualified contractors, bolstered by the University of Puerto Rico – Mayaguez, a 
world-renowned educational institution and global leader in those disciplines. Through local 
 
108 “Defense Environmental Restoration Program & Formerly Used Defense Sites: Culebra, Puerto Rico.” U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, 2020 
109 “ACONER: Who We Are.” Puerto Rico Association of Renewable Energy Consultants & Contractors, 2020 
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publications and news reports, you can see that these market participants are turning into high gear 
and preparing themselves for the ramp-up in renewable energy projects, as local sentiment mirrors 
global trajectory of these technologies and projects.     
 
Recommendations 
 The results of our preliminary analysis, when interpreted holistically, express generally 
favorable conditions in which to develop a 10MW solar farm on the island municipality of Culebra. 
Exceptional solar irradiance and available land resources helped produce encouraging production 
estimates from the modeling programs utilized. These estimates indicate a 10MW solar farm on 
Culebra would produce roughly the equivalent of all energy consumed on the island, using the 
rationale that both Vieques and Culebra consume 46,500,00 kWh’s annually and Vieques is 4 
times larger than Culebra, so Culebra would consume approximately 10,000,000 kWh’s every 
year. Paired with an energy storage technology, a solar farm of this size could theoretically power 
Culebra and enable the energy independence of the island. The electrical interconnection of the 
10MW solar farm would also fit nicely with current and proposed network configurations of the 
power system as seen in Figure 2.9, aligning with the eastern/northeastern portion of each design.  
 
 
Figure 2.9 – Various Power System Configurations Highlighting Connection Point for Submarine Cable to Vieques at Daguao 
Substation Conforming to Eastern Quadrant of all Maps 
Simplified financial calculations using production estimates and historical PPA 
compensation figures also suggest that this type of project on Culebra would be profitable. We 
have good reason to believe that a private developer can benefit from local market forces and 
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stakeholder sentiment. Attractive financial incentives and possible tax exemptions create a 
lucrative environment in which to initiate a solar farm infrastructure project, supplemented by low 
barriers to entry and a mostly collaborative and welcoming clean energy industry on the island. 
The utility company PREPA, local politicians, industry experts, and resident populations now 
understand the need to rebuild and decentralize the power system in Puerto Rico, and the inevitable 
role that renewable energy will play in that transition. Although our investigation found the 
possibility of developing a solar farm on Culebra to be quite promising, this information must only 
be used as a starting point from which to dive deeper. To conclude our evaluation, it is our 
judgment that the development of a 10MW solar farm on Culebra has the potential to be a 
profitable and beneficial venture, yet more research is needed before any significant investment is 
made. More precise financial calculations need to be completed that include compounding 
variables such as taxes, incentives, depreciation, revenue escalation, and solar panel degradation. 
PREPA must also be consulted to determine what current infrastructure capacity is and what 
substation upgrades may be needed. At this go – no go junction though it is recommended that the 
construction of a 10MW solar farm on Culebra proceed with further investigation as preliminary 




















Project Implications and Considerations for the Future 
 
 
Culebra as a Demonstration  
 Understanding that a utility-scale solar farm is technologically and economically feasible 
for the small island municipality of Culebra, we can begin to think about what impacts such a 
structure may have on the surrounding region if it were to be constructed. The successful 
installation and operation of a solar farm on Culebra could serve as a demonstration for nearby 
islands that the concept of variable generation and renewable energy is not only achievable, but 
practical in an area served with abundant natural resources such as solar irradiation and sustained 
wind speeds110. These natural resources coupled with favorable economic costs highlight the 
efficacy of using these types of technology to sustain local power systems. Although we did not 
include the separate caveat of energy storage in our earlier plans and designs (for simplicity’s 
sake), this is an area that would need to be explored further to truly realize the benefits of energy 
independence.  
The study and comparison of energy storage technologies will need to take place at the 
local level as they will depend on characteristics associated with the region and landscape in which 
they are being considered. These characteristics include variables such as temperature, topography, 
and local technical expertise. For example, we see with the Canary island of El Hierro that the 
topography supports the use of pumped hydro as a storage technology with its mountainous terrain. 
The island has constructed a pumped hydro facility atop an elevated basin that holds a large 
reservoir where water is pumped into with the use of excess wind energy, which is then allowed 
to drain via gravity and power a generator during times when the wind is not blowing111. While 
there are several examples of small islands using renewable energy technologies (some with 
storage), the installation of such on the island of Culebra would help to solidify the technology’s 
legitimacy, especially in the Caribbean region which is still highly dependent of foreign oil and 
gas imports for electricity generation.  
 
110 “Puerto Rico Territory Profile Overview.” U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020 
111 “The Sustainable Island.” Government of the Canary Islands: El Hierro, 2020 
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It would be reasonable to believe that Culebra’s use of large-scale renewable energy could 
encourage neighboring islands to seriously consider the idea of adopting similar infrastructure, in 
the sense that it could serve as a catalyst for the region and even the possibility of initiating some 
type of domino effect. The Caribbean region is poised to transition to renewable energy for its 
electricity supply, and the with the use of advancing storage technologies, could really achieve 
significant increases to overall resiliency in the face of a changing climate. This would also 
strengthen island nations’ autonomy by reducing or eliminating dependence on foreign energy 
sources to power their grids, helping shield local economies from fossil fuel price volatility in the 
process. A close neighbor of Culebra that would also benefit from the deployment of renewable 
energy is Vieques, Puerto Rico’s other island municipality.  
 
Keeping the Momentum with Vieques 
Vieques lies approximately 10 miles southwest of Culebra and is home to a population of 
9,000 residents. As previously discussed, the island receives its electrical power from mainland 
Puerto Rico via submarine cable and has been susceptible to failure in the past. Vieques displays 
similar conditions to Culebra that would make it an ideal location for distributed generation and 
microgrid application. The major difference though between the two island municipalities is the 
sheer size of Vieques, which surpasses Culebra by 40 square miles. Two thirds of the island of 
Vieques is currently designated as wildlife refuge and is uninhabited. These eastern and western 
portions of the island were once used as U.S. military bases and training grounds for explosive 
ordinance resulting in some contamination of the land. These areas are undergoing cleanup efforts 
by federal agencies and thus explain why they are mostly off limit to residents of the island and 
are zoned for wildlife112. When all unexploded ordinance is secured and removed, these sites 
would make excellent locations for brownfield redevelopment efforts, especially renewable energy 
installations.  
The island could use this area of roughly 14,000 acres113 to generate a clean supply of 
power which it could then export to mainland Puerto Rico or Culebra under existing transmission 
paths. The proposed installation on Culebra could help motivate Vieques to repurpose their 
brownfields into usable assets that would generate reliable energy and local jobs, contributing to 
 
112 “Environmental Restoration Former Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Area - Vieques, Puerto Rico.” U.S. Navy: 
Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command, 2020 
113 “Area Calculator: Vieques.” Map Developers, 2020 
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the sustainability of the island. The modular nature of renewable energy and storage technologies 
make it easier to scale up than traditional fossil fuel power plants, allowing for the gradual growth 
and economic funding of these renewable energy farms over the long-term. Just as a potential solar 
farm on Culebra might help accelerate the deployment of renewable energy on nearby islands, it 
may also contribute to the more robust adoption of, and transition to, a cleaner power system in 
general with regard to the development of offshore wind energy in the region.  
 
Offshore Wind Energy Development  
The next major shift in the U.S. energy sector is the adoption of offshore wind. The U.S. 
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) has been soliciting requests for proposals and 
awarding leases for blocks of offshore land to several wind energy companies for the development 
of large-scale wind energy installations, shown in Figure 3.1114.  
 
Figure 3.1 – Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Lease Agreements for Offshore Wind Developments in the North Atlantic 
 
114 “Renewable Energy Maps and GIS Data: Wind Planning Areas, Wind Energy Areas and Leasing Areas.” U.S. 




Wind energy companies have already signed PPA agreements with electric utilities in 
several east coast states, ensuring offtakers for the electrical energy produced by these wind 
farms115. Offshore wind is by far the most likely renewable energy technology to replace baseload 
fossil fuel power plants for electrical demand in the near future due to the capability of installing 
larger turbines and having steadier wind supplies offshore. The special relationship that the U.S. 
shares with Puerto Rico could become advantageous for the small island in this scenario, with the 
availability of, and proximity to, U.S. wind energy experts and financial institutions to help guide 
the exploration of this technology for Puerto Rico. Again, the successful installation of a utility-
scale solar farm on Culebra would further legitimize a transition towards renewable energy, also 
signaling to the U.S. that the government of Puerto Rico is serious about diversifying their energy 
supply, and have the political will and local support for these types of projects. Another logical 
step in the evolution of electric power systems in the Caribbean region would be to explore the 
concept of interconnecting and synchronizing several island grids together through the installation 
of submarine power cables to share the benefits of large-scale dispersed renewable generation.  
 
Interconnection and Regional Transmission Networks 
There have been focused efforts over the last 15 years to assess the viability of connecting 
Caribbean power grids through submarine cables, essentially consolidating various electrical 
apparatus that would then become available to areas where they are most needed, even neighboring 
islands116. We already see this configuration with the power grid in Puerto Rico, linking Vieques 
and Culebra’s electrical networks to mainland Puerto Rico. Due to Puerto Rico’s experience with 
submarine transmission, as well as the advanced nature of their electrical infrastructure 
(comparatively speaking, with other parts of the Caribbean), most studies have centered around 
designs that link Puerto Rico’s power grid with that of the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI). Two of the 
three USVI’s have been identified as being ideal candidates for interconnection via submarine 
cable with mainland Puerto Rico – St. Thomas and St. John; unfortunately, the depths of the Virgin 
 
115 Beiter, Philipp, Paul Spitsen, Walter Musial, and Eric Lantz. 2019. “The Vineyard Wind Power Purchase 
Agreement: Insights for Estimating Costs of U.S. Offshore Wind Projects.” February 2019 
116 “The Project: Reliable, Cleaner, and Lower-Cost Power for the Caribbean.” CARITrans, 2020 
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Island Basin (sea trench where depths reach ~2,000 meters117) make an interconnection with St. 
Croix unfeasible, as seen in Figure 3.2.  
 
St. Thomas and St. John share 
geopolitical ties with Puerto Rico, are 
of close physical proximity, and have 
relatively low overall electrical 
demand that have made them the 
prime targets for study. Major 
benefits of sharing electrical tie-lines 
between these two territories include 
the socialization of spinning reserves, 
excess capacity, voltage and 
frequency regulation, greater penetration of renewable energy, and strengthened 
telecommunication channels through submarine cables that encompass both power and fiber 
lines118. All of these benefits would serve to improve the reliability and resiliency of the network 
by creating more transmission paths and increasing access to more generating units. If there is an 
electrical disturbance to any one area of the grid, redundant paths and diversified options would 
help alleviate the condition by reducing or avoiding stress on other parts of the system. The 
interconnection of electrical networks may also encourage multilateral cooperation and 
international relations in the region.  
Interconnections are not without their limitations though, and just as they may encourage 
cooperation, they may also be a source of contention and disagreement. In order to operate power 
grids, there must be a single point of authority that dictates the flow and balancing of power assets. 
In this respect, an interconnection between two separate entities would necessitate the creation of 
an Independent System Operator (ISO), or a single governing body that controls and manages the 
flow of power. Although decision-making teams at the ISO can be comprised of individual’s from 
 
117 Liu, Hanlin, and Guoquan Wang. “Relative Motion between St. Croix and the Puerto Rico-Northern Virgin Islands 
Block Derived from Continuous GPS Observations (1995–2014).” International Journal of Geophysics, vol. 2015, 27 
August 2015 
118 Gevorgian, Vahan. “Renewable Energy and Inter-island Power Transmission.” National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory, 6 May 2011, pp. 27-33 
Figure 3.2 – National Renewable Energy Laboratory 2011 Proposed Design 
for Inter-Island Transmission Connection: Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands 
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all territories, there may still arise disagreement around which generating assets to bring online, 
and which directions to move the power, often having economic implications that may favor one 
territory over the other, coincidentally119. Other challenges to submarine interconnection of power 
grids are seabed geological formations between two tie points (St. Croix for example), the potential 
to become too reliant on neighboring bodies to meet local electrical demand, and the high costs 
associated with the installation of submarine cabling itself.  
The one section of cable between mainland Puerto Rico and St. Thomas was estimated to 
cost $120M for a high voltage alternating current (HVAC) line, and $176M for a high voltage 
direct current (HVDC) line120. The countries could share the cost and approach Development 
Banks (with appetite for electrical projects and renewable energy) for funding, such as the Inter-
American Development Bank, Caribbean Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, or 
International Finance Corporation (World Bank) just to name a few. With renewable energy 
projects and power grid upgrades mostly proven to yield solid returns, as well as helping fight 
climate change, many institutions have chosen to finance these projects as part of their long-term 
investment strategies. A noteworthy option for reducing the costs associated with a Puerto Rico – 
USVI interconnection is to explore the path from Vieques and/or Culebra to St. Thomas or St. 
John, a path that has been lacking attention and analysis over the years. These paths would reduce 
the overall length of cable needed, dramatically reducing the expense of the project since the actual 
cables represent more than 80% of the total costs of the project121. Building utility-scale renewable 
energy projects on Culebra and/or Vieques would make these islands more attractive as viable 
options for interconnection points since they would have large sources of generation, making them 
better able to supply power demands of small neighboring islands such as the USVI. Developing 
greater pockets of distributed generation with renewable energy from Independent Power 
Producers (IPP) would also support a transition towards more competitive wholesale markets.  
 
 
119 Arizu, Beatriz, et al. “Regulating Transmission: Why System Operators Must Be Truly Independent.” The World 
Bank Group: Private Sector and Infrastructure Network, no. 226, January 2001. Public Policy for the Private Sector. 
120 “Synergy and Interconnection Projects.” Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority and InterAmerican Energy Sources, 
7 April 2011, p. 8 
121 “Interconnection Feasibility Study - Final Report.” Siemens: Prepared for Virgin Islands Water & Power 
Authority, 1 August 2011, pp. 9-3 – 9-5 
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Deregulation and Wholesale Energy Markets 
Additional advancements could occur in Puerto Rico’s power sector through means of 
changes to the economic models or financial structures by which PREPA operates. Currently, this 
electric utility is publicly owned and largely vertically integrated; there is very little competition 
present in Puerto Rico’s power industry. The consequences of lack of private enterprise and 
competition are well documented and typically result in a product or service that is of lower 
quality, less efficient, and more expensive when compared to the same goods produced through 
private business and we can certainly see this with the electricity produced and consumed in Puerto 
Rico. PREPA recently made the decision to privatize the operation and maintenance (O+M) of the 
island’s T&D network and ultimately awarded a contract for these services to newly formed 
company LUMA Energy122. The next step would be to liberalize the buying and selling of 
electricity with the introduction of wholesale markets and implementation of locational marginal 
pricing (LMP) to reduce the overall cost of electricity. We also saw a major shift in energy markets 
in the U.S. during the process of deregulation which separated the generation and T&D businesses 
of energy companies, generally leading to more competitive prices for the average consumer123.  
 
Conclusion  
The increase in privately constructed renewable energy plants would influence the local 
markets by introducing more competitive supplies of electricity, while simultaneously 
strengthening the area’s electric reliability through decentralizing the power supply. The impact 
that a large utility-scale solar farm on Culebra may have on the regional energy landscape should 
not be underestimated or overlooked. All of these potential ancillary effects – Vieques renewable 
energy, offshore wind, regional interconnections, and a privatized power industry – share 
symbiotic relationships and can each influence the other. If an analysis of contemporary challenges 
endured by PREPA and the power grid in Puerto Rico has taught us anything, it is that real 
fundamental change is needed. An energy transition toward smaller decentralized supplies with 
microgrid applications are needed to resolve the inadequacies and vulnerability of the current 
configuration. This is especially true for the island municipalities of Vieques and Culebra, who 
 
122 “Puerto Rico Public-Private Partnership for the Electric Power Transmission and Distribution System.” Puerto 
Rico Public-Private Partnership Committee Report, May 2020, p. 3-6 
123 Warwick, W. M. “A Primer on Electric Utilities, Deregulation, and Restructuring of U.S. Electricity Markets (Rev. 
2).” Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: Prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy, May 2002, pp. 7.1-7.3 
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stand to gain the most from more resilient and flexible energy infrastructure, to better handle 
PREPA’s mismanagement as well as extreme weather events during an era of climate change. Let 













































APPENDIX A (Site 1 – Barrio Frailes)  
 
 


























































APPENDIX B (Site 2 – Barrio San Isidro) 
 
 




















































APPENDIX C (Site 3 – Barrio Playa Sardinas) 
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